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1. Introduction 
Military expenditures undoubtedly absorb resources which are sub-
stantial enough to make a considerable difference both in the level 
of investment for civil purposes and in the volume of resources 
which can be devoted to improving man's lot through social and 
other services. There is no doubt that a transfer of resources from 
military to civil uses would provide further possibilities for an in-
crease in the rate of economic growth. 1 (Jolly, 1978, p. 7) 
This judgment is made in a 1912 UN report entitled: Economic and 
Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures. "If 
there were no arms race" the report concludes, "trade and other ex-
changes would most certainly be easier. One major effect of the arms 
race and military expenditure has been to reduce the priority given to aid 
in the policies of donor countries2 (Jolly, 1978, p. 7). This logic has char-
acterized the United Nations (1978, 1979, 1981) approach to disarma-
ment over the years. 3 (See also Thorisson, 1983.) The basic presumption 
made by the UN is that (1) military expenditures are the result of arms 
races; (2) these arms races are irrational; (3) the military expenditures 
thus have no productive role; and (4) if only rationality would prevail, 
arms races would be halted and the resources that would have gone into 
military expenditures could be utilized to increase the productive capaci-
ty of the Third World. 
The attractiveness of these argumenfs is obvious, yet almost to a 
country the Third World has resisted or at least not actively participated 
in disarmament. Are Third World leaders irrational or are the UN's basic 
assumptions incorrect? By examining both the factors underlying Third 
25 
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World military expenditures and the impacts these expenditures have on 
other facets of the economy, we attempt to understand the general un-
willingness of Third World nations to disarm. Tentatively, our results in-
dicate that the Third World is far from hom~geneous and that it makes a 
certain amount of sense to incorporate political-security and economic 
variables as a means of classifying countries into two groups - those 
countries which have a high level of internal and/or external threat com-
bined with a low level of governmental legitimacy and effectiveness (here 
classified as conflict countries) and those countries who have a relatively 
high level of governmental legitimacy and face relatively low internal 
and/ or external threats (here classified as non-conflict countries). It is 
shown that the factors underlying economic expenditures in these groups 
are somewhat different, as are the impacts these expenditures have 'on 
other economic variables. 
It turns out that the countries we might expect would be most recep-
tive to movements toward disarmament, the non-conflict states, actually 
appear to receive a number of net economic benefits from defense expen-
ditures. Their enthusiasm for disarmament may therefore be minimal. Of 
course, the conflict countries, concerned with regime survival, would 
also have little interest in disarmament. 
2. The Security Dilemma in The Third World 
Countries obviously increase expenditures because of perceived 
threats, whether external or internal. It is just as obvious that many 
Third World countries face minimal external or internal threats, but still 
allocate resources for defense. It is apparent that different factors moti-
vate military expenditures and that the ability to finance military expen-
ditures also varies considerably in the Third World. It makes little sense 
therefore to treat all Third World countries as a homogeneous group4 
(Looney and Frederiksen 1986a, 1986b). 
Furthermore, it is increasingly apparent that the simple arms race 
models are incapable of accounting for the level of military expenditures 
in the majority of less developed countries. 5 (Jreddenick, 1985; Maizels 
and Nissanke, 1985). 
For example, in a recent article, 6 Harris (1986) found in examining 
the defense expenditures of ASEAN countries that the size of GNP deter-
mines the broad order of magnitude of defense expenditures and that 
domestic economic conditions influence its level in any year. He notes, 
however, that 
'This is not to say that geo-political fdrces have an insignificant in-
fluence but these are difficult to incorporate into the analysis. This 
conclusion can be clarified by making a distinction between a 
• 
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government's ability and its willingness to allocate funds to 
defense. Clearly, its ability will be greater the larger the amount of 
resources at its disposal, and this explains why Singapore and 
Malaysia are relatively big spenders. However, above some 
minimum level of defense expenditures, unless there is a threat to 
security, defense is in competition with other users, many of which 
more obviously meet urgent social needs."7 (Harris, 1986, p. 47) . 
27 
Harris concludes that given this point, there is a tendency for 
defense expenditures to increase only modestly in the absence of a threat 
to security and to respond to fluctuations in domestic economic well-
being. On the other hand: 8 
A government's willingness to ignore spending on defense, and to 
justify the consequent reduction in spending elsewhere, will be in~ 
fluenced by geo-political factors. We have referred before to the 
rapid increase in ASEAN defense expenditures since 1979 in re-
sponse to a perceived threat from Vietnam. Yet here, too, economic 
forces influenced by falling export prices have forced revisions of 
defense expansion plans. Early in 1984 Malaysia's defense expan-
sion slackened because of the impact of economic recession, and 
the Philippines has spent far less on defense than other ASEAN 
countries in recent years, principally because of severe economic 
problems. (Harris, 1986, pp. 47-48) 
One way of incorporating the security threat aspect of the need for 
defense expenditures with the economic means of supporting defense ex-
penditures is to divide Third World countries into two groups, one in-
cluding countries with high levels of external and internal threat, and the 
other group containing countries that face relatively low levels of threat. 
Rothstein9 (1986) has not only already classified countries along 
these lines, but also further subdivided countries based on the degree of 
(high, medium, and low) legitimacy of these governments. 10 (p. 30). This 
classification scheme yields a consolidated number of country groupings. 
As one might imagine, however, countries with high to medium legiti-
macy (and high effectiveness) tend to have low levels of threat, while 
countries with low legitimacy (and effectiveness) have high threats 
(usually internal). Dividing Third World countries on the basis of legiti-
macy (as of the early 1980s) therefore, two groups can be derived. One of 
these (conflict) is characterized as having a low level of governmental 
legitimacy, effectiveness, and high threats, while the other is character-
ized by relatively high governmental legitimacy, effectiveness, and low 
threat (the countries classified on this basis are listed in Appendix A). It 
should be noted that, in several cases when legitimacy and threat did not 
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coincide, i.e., medium legitimacy and high threat or low legitimacy and 
low threat, legitimacy was the ruling criterion in classification. As Roth-
stein notes: 11 
In each case high legitimacy countries spend less on average than 
medium legitimacy countries and the latter spend less than low 
legitmacy countries ... 
There is no such thing as "the" security problem of developing 
countries: the type of threat and its intensity make a difference. But 
the tables also make the more arguable point that internal condi-
tions - how effective the government is in either meeting or con-
taining citizen demands and to what degree it can count on volun-
tary citizen compliance with its policies make some difference in 
security decisions. (p. 33) 
This latter observation is consistent with several general proposi-
tions put forward by Charles Wolf12 (1981, pp. 76-80). In the outlines the 
Wolf thesis assumes that: 13 
1. Sustained economic development requires political stability 
(although it may also contribute to such stability). 
2. Political stability reduces uncertainty or equivalently increases 
predictability and both opportunity and incentive for innova-
tions. It thereby provides a useful, though certainly not infallible, 
mechanism for distinguishing and selecting between more and 
less productive use of resources. 
3. Economic development typically and probably inevitably 
generates political, social, institutional, and psychological side 
effects that are profoundly destabilizing, both internally and ex-
ternally. 
4. These destabilizing pressures can be contained and controlled in 
part through the development and proper use of suitable military 
and paramilitary forces and capabilities. 
5. Such military capabilities are thus complementary to maintaining 
and sustaining economic development, rather than conflicting 
with it. 
There seem to be bits of truth in what both Rothstein and Wolf are 
arguing. Wolf may have overgeneralized his observations; however, 
they are likely to be more valid for the noh-conflict countries as defined 
above. Put differently, a certain amount of stability and political 
legitimacy is likely to be required before added defense expenditures can 
• 
• 
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create further stability. Their generally lower level in the non-conflict 
countries would mean that defense expenditures are likely to be in less 
competition for resources with the civilian sector than in the conflict 
countries. Since defense expenditures are not as necessary as in the con-
flict group, presumably they could be curtailed if they began detracting 
from economic performance. On the other hand, the degree of instability 
and economic uncertainty already existing in the conflict countries is 
unlikely to be overcome by military expenditures (if anything, increased 
military expenditures may be interpreted by the private sector as a sign 
the government is losing control). If these generalizations are correct, it is 
easy to see why there is so little enthusiasm in the Third World for disar-
mament. The conflict countries can't afford to disarm, and the non-
conflict countries may suffer a deterioration in economic performance 
brought about by the resulting reductions in security and political stabili-
ty. The empirical analysis in the following sections tests to the extent 
possible the modified Wolf thesis that defense expenditures are likely to 
provide net economic benefits to the non-conflict countries, but none to 
the conflict states. 
3. Results 
One of the main predictions of the Wolf thesis is that under some 
circumstances military expenditure in developing countries can play a 
productive role in increasing the level of internal security, thus providing 
a more stable environment for economic activity. If this is the case, we 
should expect this effect to be particularly significant in increasing longer 
term economic decisions such as the share of savings and investment in 
gross domestic product. That is, higher levels of internal stability stem-
ming from increased military expenditures, everything else equal, should 
creat~ an atmosphere whereby savers and investors are willing to mobi-
lize their resources for commitments to the future. 
Most likely, however, investors and savers will require some 
minimal level of stability before seriously considering longer run com-
mitments. However, the political regimes in the conflict countries, as 
defined above, may well be considered too unstable by savers and in-
vestors to step up their activities even while increased military expendi-
tures are being undertaken. In short, there may be some threshold level 
of security which if not met could make the Wolf thesis a moot point. To 
test this hypothesis, the impact of increased military burdens (the share 
of GNP allocated to military expenditur~s) on the share of savings and 
investment in GDP was separately estimated for the conflict and non-
conflict groups of countries. 
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The structural form of the regression equation with expected signs 
was: 
Where14 
GDIB = f (RBB, AS, SMEY) 
+ + 
GDIB is the share of investment in gross domestic product, 1982 
RBB is the resource balance (negative values indicating increased 
capital inflows) as a share of GDP in 1982 
SMEY is the share of military expenditures in GNP 1981 
AS is the average savings rate 1970 - 1981 
In short, after controlling for the two main determinants of investment, 
net capital inflows from abroad, and the level of saving, the impact of 
military expenditures is evaluated. The anticipated sign of military 
expenditures is positive and statistically significant for the non-conflict 
countries, but it is either insignificant or significant and negative in the 
case of the conflict states. The results (Table 1) are as anticipated: 
1. The conflict countries experience positive impact on investment 
from increases in their military burdens, with added military ex-
penditures being highly significant. 
2. Overall resource inflows, savings and military expenditures ac-
count for nearly 47% of the observed fluctuations in investment. 
This increases to 54 % when the marginal savings rate (MS) for 
1970-81 is substituted for the average savings rate(AS) 
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TABLE 1 
Impact of Defense Expenditures and Investments and Savings: 
Non Conflict, Conflict States 
(Standardized Estimates) 
Independent Variables· Statistics 
Equation RBS AS SMEY MS PDPB r2 F DF 
Non-Conflict 
(1) GDIB = -0.48 0.52 0.50 
(-3.93) (4.18) (4.74) 0.469 14.3 51 
! (2) -0.39 0.41 0.60 
(-3.33) (3.96) (5.06) 0.541 17.32 47 
Conflict 
(3) GDIB = -1.05 0.81 0.03 
(-6.40) (5.75) (-0.28) 0.736 19.56 24 
(4) 
-0.83 0.04 0.66 
(-4.54) (0.22) (4.11) 0.622 10.66 22 
(Non-Conflict) 
(5) GDIB = 0.74 0.25 0.24 
(12.43 (4.17) (4.74) 0.876 113.29 51 
(6) 0.74 0.19 0.28 
(13.68) (3.96) (5.06) 0.902 135.06 47 
(7) 0.74 0.27 0.23 0.06 
(12.44) (4.33) (4.65) (1.17) 0.879 85.99 51 
Conflict 
(8) GDIB= 0.42 0.00 -0.03 
(3.40) (5.72) (-0.33) 0.853 40.78 24 
( 9) 0.57 0.02 0.48 
(4.28) (0.17) (4.06) 0.800 25.31 22 
(10) 0.50 0.62 O.o2 0.25 
(4.88) (7.24) (0.36) (3.39) 0.907 48.79 24 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols; ( = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DF = degrees of freedom 
r2 = correlation coefficient 
3. The conflict countries on the other hand do not derive any stimu-
lating effects on investment from increased military burdens. For 
these countries over 70 % of the fluctuations in investment can be 
accounted for by resource inflows (RBB) and savings (AS or MS). 
Note that the standardized coefficients on resource inflows and 
savings are considerably higher fop the conflict countries, indicat-
ing the relatively greater impact of these variables on investment 
than in the case of the non-conflict states. 
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There is adequate support for the Wolf thesis; i.e., in the net, added 
military expenditures do not compete with investment for resources in 
many developing countries, but in fact contribute to an environment in 
which more resources may in fact be mobilized for economic activity. 
The effect is not universal, however, with some countries so unstable 
(and/or inept) that added military expenditures do not provide sufficient 
assurance about the future to warrant increased investment. 
Since in many less developed countries savings and investment are 
undertaken by the same groups of individuals, we should expect military 
expenditures to produce similar effects on savings. As with investment, 
the resource balance (RBB), savings (AS and MS), and the military bur-
den (SMEY) were regressed on the share of savings in GDP in 1982 
(GDSB). One additional variable, the share of public external debt in 
GNP in 1981 (PDPB) was also included in the regression equation; our 
expectation being that due to uncertainty in the conflict countries, a rela-
tively high proportion of savings would have to be mobilized by the state 
from external sources. 
The results (Table I) are quite similar to those obtained for invest-
ment, with the military burden again playing an important role in con-
tributing to the mobilization of internal savin,gs in the non-conflict coun-
tries but ineffective in this role in the case of the conflict countries. In 
short, the conflict countries appear to resort to external borrowing 
(PDPB) to augment their low levels of domestic savings, whereas the 
non-conflict countries appear capable of mobilizing local resources 
through increased internal security. 
Other relationships stemming from the contrasting impact of the 
military burden in conflict and non-conflict statt!s can provide insights as 
to the manner in which military expenditures affect resource mobiliza-
tion in the Third World. 
In particular, we ask, are added military expenditures undertaken at 
the expense of other public expenditures, or are they funded largely out 
of tax revenues imposed on the private sector7 On a priori grounds, we 
might anticipate that non-conflict states would be in a more flexible posi-
tion to allocate funds between military and non-military activities. In ad-
dition, the higher levd of government legitimacy in the conflict states 
should enable the governments in these countries to be more effective in 
mobilizing resources for defense through taxing the private sector. To 
test these hypotheses the military burden was regressed on both the share 
of public consumption in GDP in 1982 (PCB), and the share of private 
consumption in GDP in 1982 (PRB). As with investment, the control 
variables were savings (AS), the net resource balance (RBB), and the 
public external debt (PDDB). 
• 
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The results (Table 2) indicate that: 
1. Public consumption expenditures are not related to the military 
burden in non-conflict states. 
2. The military burden is directly associated with increased public 
consumption in the conflict states. 
TABLE 2 
Impact of Defense Expenditures and Investments and Savings: 
Non Conflict, Conflict States 
(Standardized Estimates) 
Independent Variables 
Equation AS RBB SMEY PDPB 
Non-Conflict 
(1) PCB= 0.26 -0.52 -0.03 
(1.67) (3.25) (0.22) 
0.44 -0.54 -0.06 0.40 
(2) (2.78) (-3.67) (0.46) (2.95) 
Conflict PCB= -0.01 -0.26 0.36 0.62 
(3) (0.01) (-1.32) (2.19) (4.29) 
Non-ConflictPRB = -0.36 -0.57 -0.24 
(4) (-4.11) (-6.61) (-3.33) 
Conflict PRB = -0.56 -0.15 -0.05 
(5) (-2.67) (-0.65) (-0.25) 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols; ( ) = t statistic 








DF = degrees of freedom 








3. The non-conflict countries largely finance added military expen-
ditures, through diverting resources from private consumption, 
whereas no relationship of the sort is present in the conflict coun-
tries . 
This second set of results appears to indicate that the relative stabili-
ty of the non-conflict countries facilitates the mobilization of resources 
for defense through the tax system, effectively tapping potential private 
consumption in this environment. Added defense expenditures apparent-
ly do not have to compete with resources "capable of flowing into produc-
tive investment. In addition, the state may have sufficient flexibility in its 
budgetary process so that the level of public consumption can be deter-
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mined somewhat independently of the level of military commitments felt 
adequate to provide a desired level of security. In sharp contrast, public 
consumption expenditures in the conflict states do not appear to be fund-
ed out of potential consumption and are linked fairly closely to overall 
government consumption. In general, therefore, military expenditure in 
the conflict countries may be more of an overall economic burden in the 
sense that they may pre-empt resources from more productive alloca-
tions than in the case of the non-conflict countries. 
While this conclusion is somewhat tentative, it not only makes intui-
tive sense, but more importantly it is consistent with other empirical 
findings. 
A major area of research in recent years has attempted to determine 
the manner in which governments prioritize budgets, i.e., do increased 
shares of defense in the central government budget occur at the expense 
of certain social expenditures, such as education and health, or are 
economic allocations reduced during periods of military expansion? To 
the surprise of most observers, the studies to date, in large part, have 
failed to discern sharp defense/non-defense budgetary tradeoffs for 
Third World countries as a whole. To some extent, the lack of statistical 
verification of possible defense/non-defense tradeoffs may stem from the 
fact that cross-section analysis, because of its static nature, is incapable 
of identifying the budgetary consequences of changes in the share of gov-
ernment defense allocations on other budgetary shares. Put differently, 
cross-section data represents the composition of country budgets. Coun-
tries with high shares of their budgets allocated to defense may have 
varied so much in the manner in which other budgetary activities were 
underfunded, that no overall statistical pattern or linkages between 
defense and non-defense expenditures are present. 
The form of the regression equation utilized for examining defense/ 
non-defense tradeoffs is 
X = a + b GNPER + cDEF 
I 
Where: 
xi refers to the share of the budget allocated to the non-defense cate-
gory, GNPPER is per capita income utilized as a control variable, and 
DEF is the share of defense in the central government budget. The results 
(Table 3) indicate that several distinctive patterns occur, depending on 
whether a country is in the conflict or non-conflict grouping: 
1. In general, the non-conflict countries show a strong positive rela-
tionship between the share of defense expenditures in the govern-
ment budget and allocations to sociaf expenditures. This is par-
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TABLE 3 
Defense Non-Defense Budgetary Tradeoffs 
(Standardized coefficients) 
Conflict States Non-Conflict States 
Independent Intlependent 
Variables Statistics Variables Statistics 
Equation GNP PER DEF r' F DF GNPPER DEF r' F 
1. Public Services 
-0.38 -0.11 0.70 
(-1.46) (-0.60) 0.240 2.37 17 (-0.94) (5.77) 0.510 17.72 
2. Education 
-0.06 -0.29 -0.18 0.46 
(-0.21) (-1.00) 0.105 0.87 17 (-1.21) (3.11) 0.259 5.94 
3. Health 0.12 -0.53 -0.05 0.52 
(0.48) (-1.97) 0.224 2.16 17 (-0.38) (3.55) 0.278 6.53 
4. Social Security 0.62 -0.59 0.12 0.24 
(2.54) (-2.39) 0.346 3.97 17 (0.70) (1.42) 0.065 1.19 
5. Housing 0.05 -0.10 0.32 -0.02 
(0.18) (-0.33) 0.001 0.06 17 (1.95) (-0.10) 0.102 1.92 
6. Other Social 
-0.07 0.05 -0.11 0.58 
(-0.22) (0.18) 0.001 0.03 17 (-0.79) (4.26) 0.365 9.78 
7. Agriculture 
-0.33 0.ol -0.36 0.50 
(-1.14) (0.07) 0.101 0.85 17 (-2.60) (-3.58) 0.346 9.03 
8. Roads 0.04 -0.30 -0.11 0.56 
(0.15) (-1.03) 0.081 0.64 17 (-0.77) (3.89) 0.332 8.19 
9. Other Transport 
-0.34 0.35 -0.14 0.53 
(1.19) (1.21) 0.112 0.94 17 (-0.94) (3.81) 0.322 8.07 
10. Other Economic 
-0.19 -0.15 0.01 -0.17 
(-0.66) (-0.51) 0.091 0.73 17 (0.07) (-1.01) 0.030 0.53 
NOTES: See text for definition of symbols; ( ) - t statistic 
F = F statistic 
r1 :m: correlation coefficient 













2. In sharp contrast, the conflict countries have on the whole experi-
enced only negative tradeoffs between defense and the various 
social allocations. (However, only social security is statistically 
significant at the 95% level, and health at the 90% level.) 
3. What negative trade-offs occur for the non-conflict countries are 
largely in reductions in the economic area, particularly agricul-
ture. 
4. The positive link between defense and social allocations extends 
to roads and other transport in the non-conflict countries. 
5. The non-conflict countries do not experience any statistically sig-
nificant patterns between allocations to defense and economic 
services. 
In general, therefore, the non-conflict countries demonstrate a number of 
clear budgetary patterns, whereas the conflict countries are so varied in 
the manner in which budgetary priorit~s are established that no overall 
conclusion can be made as to the manner in which non-defense shares are 
affected during periods of expanded defense expenditures. Again, the 
non-conflict countries appear to be able to manage their defense budgets 
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with relatively few adverse effects in other areas. The same cannot be 
said for the conflict countries. 
This finding is further confirmed by examining the relative impact of 
military expenditures on various socio-economic indices in both the con-
flict and non-conflict countries. Utilizing the fourteen socio-economic 
measures listed by Sivard, a factor analysis was first undertaken to deter-
mine the major underlying socio-economic phenomenon characterizing 
both groups of countries. Interestingly enough, the four major trends 
(factors) were identical for both the conflict and non-conflict countries. 
These measures of socio-economic development can be characterized as 
follows: 
1. Quality of life comprising: (a) percent of women in total universi-
ty enrollment; (b) life expectancy; (c) literacy rate; (d) percent of 
population with safe water; and (e) infant mortality rate. 
2. Government expenditures per capita, comprising: (a) public 
education expenditures per capita; (b) per capita income; and (c) 
public health expenditures per capita. 
3. Nutrition, comprising: (a) calorie supply per capita; and (b) pro-
tein supply per capita. 
4. The number of professionals per capita, comprising: (a) popula-
tion per physician; and (b) school age population per teacher. 
To determine the possible negative impacts increased military ex-
pense might have on socio-economic development, several measures of 
the military burden were regressed on the factor scores of the conflict and 
non-conflict country groupings. The results (Table 4) indicate that: 
1. Increases in military expenditures tend to have a negative impact 
on the quality of life in the Third World, but relationship is not 
highly significant. 
2. Military expenditures tend to be highly (and positively) corre-
lated with health and education expenditures in the non-conflict 
countries, but occur at the expense of allocations in these areas in 
the non-conflict states. 
3. Military expenditures are associated with improved levels of 
nutrition in the Third World, but this pattern is only statistically 
significant in the case of conflict countries. 
4. There is no statistically significant relationship between military 
expenditures and the number of doctors and teachers per capita 
in the Third World (although in the non-conflict countries a weak 
relationship seems to hold betwe~n increased military expen-
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TABLE 4 
IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CONFLICT: 
NON-CONFLICT STATES 
(Standardized Estimates) 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Equation GNP PER SMBY SMB r2 F DF 
Quality of Life 
(1) Conflict 0.80 -0.23 
(6.12) (-1.87) 0.642 21.50 26 
(2) Non-Conflict 0.54 -0.15 
(4.52) (-1.24) 0.329 11.28 48 
Government Expenditures 
Per Capita 
(3) Conflict 1.04 -0.28 
(10.61) (-2.80) 0.841 63.63 26 
(4) Non-Conflict 0.63 0.58 
(13.67) (12.74) 0.906 221.49 48 
Nutrition 
(5) Conflict 0.77 0.15 
(6.31) (1.25) 0.754 36.78 26 
(6) Non-Conflict 0.69 0.20 
(7.10) (2.01) 0.579 31.68 48 
Population 
Per Professional 
(7) Conflict -0.54 -0.12 
(-2.77) -063) 0.379 7.43 26 
(8) Non-Conflict -0.41 -0.20 
(-3.19) (-1.50) 0.247 7.54 48 
NOTES: See text for definition of symbols; ( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
r2 = correlation coefficient 
DF = degree of freedom 
The final area of examination concerns the composition of military 
expenditures. In a recent study, Weede (1986) found a strong and posi-
tive relationship in Third World countries between the military burden 
as measured by the armed forces per capita and overall economic 
growth. This main argument stresses the positive spinoffs on human 
capital provided by military service. He contends (but does not demon-
strate) that similar amounts of money 1'pent on weapons would most 
likely impact negatively on overall economic growth. If Weede's argu-
ments are correct, and given the generally positive effect of military ex-
penditures found for the non-conflict countries (and negative effects for 
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the conflict countries), we should expect to find increased military expen-
ditures undertaken due largely to increased size of the armed forces in the 
non-conflict countries. In contrast, the conflict countries should experi-
ence a close association between military expenditures and weapons ac-
quisition (proxied by arms imports). To test this thesis, military expendi-
tures in both groups of countries were regressed on armed forces and 
arms imports. Gross national product (the overall economic capability of 
supporting military expenditures) and the balance of payments (reflect-
ing possible foreign exchange constraints) were introduced into the 
regression as control variables. The sign on the balance of payments term 
is expected to be positive for both groups of countries, indicating the 
stimulating effect of balance of payments surpluses on military acquisi-
tions in particular and defense budgetary allocations in general. The 
results (Table 5) demonstrate the power of economic variables in ac-
counting for variations in Third World military expenditures, with 
87.7% of the fluctations in military expenditures in non-conflict coun-
tries and 80% in the conflict countries accounted for by the gross domes-
tic product (GDPB) and balance of payments (CAB) (all figures for 
1981). 
On the margin, the armed forces (AF) are statistically significant and 
positive in contributing to the determination of total military expendi-
tures in the non-conflict countries, but not in the case of the conflict 
countries. On the other hand, arms imports make a positive and statistic-
ally significant contribution to military expenditures in the conflict states 
but not the non-conflict group of countries. 
4. Conclusions 
The above analysis demonstrated the significant role economic fac-
tors as opposed to arms-race explanations play in affecting military ex-
penditures in the Third World. Economic factors are modified somewhat 
depending on whether the country has a relatively high degree of threat 
or not, but they are equally present in conflict and non-conflict states. 
Are Third World countries rational in their approach to military spend-
ing? In a sense, the analysis above indicates that they are. Depending on 
the level of perceived threat, developing countries in large part allocate 
resources to defense in line with their resource constraints. Would disar-
mament benefit the Third World? The conflict countries might well 
derive economic benefits through disarmament, but considering that 
most of the threats to Third World regimes are internal, arguments for 
disarmament are likely to stir little enthvsiasm from the leaders of the 
countries. On the other hand, the effect of defense on security and 
political stability first noted by Charles Wolf may well provide net bene-
fits to the non-conflict countries. Leaders of these countries are unlikely 
to sacrifice these benefits for the sake of disarmament per se. 
. ,, 
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TABLE 5 
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES: 
CONFLICT, NON-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
(Standardized Estimates) 
Indeeendent Variables Statistics 
• 
Equation GDPB CAB AF AI r• F DF 
Non-Conflict States 
(1) ME= 0.53 
(4.54) 0.228 20.64 52 
(2) 0.51 0.77 
• (9.70) (14.85) 0.878 161.75 47 
(3) 0.37 0.18 0.21 
(6.16) (16.87) (3.46) 0.904 137.84 47 
(4) 0.47 0.70 0.11 
(8.63) (10.48) (1.56) 0.884 112.08 47 
(5) 0.36 0.77 0.20 0.06 
(5.92) (11.87) (3.15) (0.98) 0.906 103.53 47 
Conflict States 
(6) ME= 0.81 
(6.65) 0.657 44.17 24 
(7) 1.57 0.87 
(7.24) (4.04) 0.806 39.49 21 
(8) 1.10 0.54 0.28 
(3.14) (1.19) (1.67) 0.832 29.77 21 
(9) 1.45 0.81 0.35 
(10.42) (5.90) (5.43) 0.927 75.69 21 
(10) 1.36 0.75 0.05 0.34 
(5.60) (3.79) (0.43) (4.72) 0.927 54.25 21 
NOTES: See text for definition of symbols( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
r• = correlation coefficient 
DF = degree of freedom 
• 
• 
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